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In the hierarchy of life sciences, psychology occupies a place between the biological disciplines, which focus on the structure, development, and functioning of organisms and the social science disciplines in which the significant unit of observation is a population groip. Psychology, which is both biological and social, takes the molar behavior of the individual in his physical and social setting as its observational unit.
A major concern of the biological and social sciences has long been the nature of the interaction of organisms and populations with the embedding environment, which supports, influences, and determines limits of structure and function for the life that exists within its domain. The generic term representing scientific study of organism-environment intefaction is Ecolomy.
Traditionally, Ecology has been recognized as a branch of biology, while the term fJIaflo has been used to 1Appreciaion is expressed of the asaistance of Mr. William C. Scott
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designate the investigations, principally by sociolcgists and geographers, of the distributions of human population groups in relation to material resources, health, social, economic, and cultural patterns. These disciplines have produced significant bodies of knowledge and theory and they have developed distinctive journals, literature, and learned Locieties.
No such formal development has yet occurred in psychology, although an ecologic emphasis has become pronounced in recent years and may well be gathering enough momentum to crystallize as a major trend in the next decade. If tis should hoppen, however, it will undoubtedly be a protest movement against strongly intrenched traditions which may indeed have themselves evolved as ecologic phenomena in the development of the science. This point will be developed later. The main thrust of this paper, however, is to argue the case for an ecologic emphasis In psychology.
The discussion will review some significant, converging developments contributing to the ecologic trend in psychology and also some issues and difficulties that must be faced and eventually resolved. This presentation is focuaed principally on Implications of the a-cologic emphasis on content and method (Winthrop, 1965) and the related opposition of behavioristic and cognitive theories, and on methodol , particularly the growing opposition of multivariate advocates to the univariate, experimental tradition Barker, 1965) . These theoretical and methodological issues also have implications for choice of content.
As In most heated controversies, an lmpartial judge can see reason on both sides of each confrontation. Our purpose is not to choose stiw,, uci tagter Lo arrive at a rational pos&tio, for the science of psychology with regard to Its objectives, choice of problems, and its methods. This Issue Is not related in any way to individual interests in choice of areas of personal involvement.
Phylogenetic Persoectlyv
Our point of departure Is the citation of a n=mber of generalizations that appear to be widely accepted. The first is the objective fact that the behavior of organisms is rooted in biological development. As a result behavior mechan!' .vs have developed and must be understood in phylogenetic perspective.
Even the psychologist who views practical human problems as predominant must acknowledge that a thorough science of palchology embraces the entire range of living species. Indeed, the Interdependence of structure and function makes it ImperaUve for the behavioral scientist to understand both the longand short-term development of the biological structures and systems that both determine hnd are determined by the molar behavior ot the organism (Murphy, 1947 (Murphy, , 1958 . rna distinguished psychologist (Hebb, 1958) has stated his position on this Issue as follows:
"The most pressing problems of behavior are those of mental illness and social conflict. The 'pure-science' ap;,ahet, tiaa dvI.cvroent of theoretical understanding, complements the practical approach by providing the only guarantee of better methods in the future. Mental illness involves perception, inenrory, emotion, thinking; so does the attitude of hostility to other peoples. But we do not fully understand perception, memory, and so on; thus, anything that tells us more about these processes, whether it is the study of the eye-blink in man or a study of the mating habits of the rat, is a potentil addition to our understanding of mental illness or the causes of social conflict." , the writer has dealt at some length with these phenomena as interactions, which am systematic and adaptive rather than random encounters between inner and outer forces.
Objections have been raised to the concept of adaptation on the grounds of its "purposive 3 overtones. the adaptive math between circumstances and species schema (Hunt, 1961 Third, the differences between species in historical posit!on, critical environment, and related response repertoires all limit the types of cross-species comparisons that may be meaningful and suggest types of comparative studies that may profitably illuminate behavior in phylogenetic perspective.
And finally, the understanding of behavior requires systematic study of the characteristics of the environmental pattern defining the ecologic niche of each species and the adaptations required by that environment as well as of response processes.
These postulates are the basis for two contextual prescriptions concerning the content of psychology: (1) There is a need for a master plan, corresponding to the periodic In their natural surrounds, as contrasted with the psychological laboratory, frutain occurred rarely, and when it did occur, It did not have the behavioral consequences observed in the laboratory (Barker, 1965) . Barker commented on this as follows:
*It appears that the earlier experiments (by Lewin, Dembo, and Barker) simulated behavior very well as we defined and prescribed It for subjects (In accordance with our theories); but the experiments did not simulate frustration as life prescribes it for children.*
We may wonder about the relation of other experimental treatments of segments of behavior to the occurrence of the designated behaviors In real-life situations.
One other example, from a paper by Gump and Kounin (1960) , the former a student of Barker's, illustrates this point further. Gump and Sutton-Smith (1955) investigated the reactions of poorly skilled players when they were put in more or less difficult game positions or roles. For example, in gamesof *tag," the U position is more demanding under some rules than others.
As they played the game experimentally, an it in the center of a rectangular playing field attempts to tag opponents who run to and from jafe areas at each end of the rectangle.
One variant of the game gives h to the IU position by permitting the child in that position to *call the turn when runners may attempt to cross from one safe position to another.
Another variant gives low power to the U1 by permitting players to run whenever they choose. In one phase of the experiment, slow runners were assigned to high-power Ui positions, and in another, to low-power it positions.
The hypotheses, that poorly skilled boys would be more successful in high-power than low-power 1i positions, and that scape-goating of these inept boys would be less frequent in the high-than low-power positions was unequivocally confirmed.
However, the authors also observed boys in natural, rather than experimental situations, in gyms, playgrounds, and camps, and obtained the following impressions: *(a) poorly skilled boys do not often get Involved in games they cannot manage; (b) if they do get involved, they often manage to avoid difficult roles by not trying to win such a position or by quitting if they cannot avoid it; and (c) if they occupy the role and are having trouble, the game often gets so boring to opponents that these opponents let themselves be caught in order to put the game back on a more zestful level."
The experimental game, which was watched by adults, was artificial in that poor competitors were inappropriately placed in skilled positions and in these circumstances no opponent ever let himself be caught. It actually created a highly unusual and, to the children, desperate circumstance, in which interfering adults were intervening agents. Gump and Kounin concluded that =The experiment probably does suggest hypotheses as to why certain games and roles are avoided by
Inept children, and it shows the extent to which children can scapegoat when conditions are artificially favorable." Unfortunately the more removed from reality it becomes, the more illusory the science will be.
What is the resolution of the dilemma? First, the need is indicated for vastly greater communicatlon and cooperation between psychology and both the blo-and social-sciences, for the methodology most appropriate to many of the fundamental psychological problems is necessarily interdisciplinary. Most present undergraduate and graduate training ;n psychology Is Inadequate in this respect.
Source data on major parameters of both the physical and social environmental and behavioral effects have been compiled and published by oceanographers, climatologists, limnologists, physicists, geologists, geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, and even psychologists, as well as many other disciplines. On the other hand, this enthusiasm must be tempered by concern with the real problems of effective field-oriented methods.
There Is no question that they will raise the cost of psychological research to an awesome degree, for they Involve multivariate observation and analysis on a time scale far in excess of present practices and over numbers of subjects, situations, and replica- at which units began or ended. They agreed very poorly on Identical inciden'e at units, yet they were able to agree on the general meaning of the sequence., m He attributed this paradoxical result to differences of the inclusiveness of goal or behavior perspectives of the Judges.
To some extent this problem is reminiscent of the experience of McClelland and his associates (Atkinson, 1958) in their efforts to obtain reliable scoring methods for TAT protocols. I am inclined to agree with Barker (1963) that increased familiarity with observeational methods will lead to Improvement of these methods.
The problem of encoding the environment is the big hurdle.
After five years of fairly continuous work on this problem (Sells, 1963a (Sells, , 1963b , I am more hopeful than previously. For one thing, it looks more viable in the frame of reference of field stud7 than from the perspective of the laboratory. I believe that the Isola- In this frame of reference a given unit may belong to more than one system and function differently in each.
I am not ready to renounce the proposed taxonomy of envkronmental variables outlined in my 1963 book because work in our laboratory (Findikyan and Sells, 1964, 1965) and elsewhere (Friedlander, 1965; Pace, 1958 Pace, , 1960 Stern, 1956; Thistlewaite, 1959a Thistlewaite, , 1959b Astin, 1961 Astin, , 1962 Astin, , 1963 has demonstreted the value of multivariate analysis of variables used to measure the more obscure and subtle aspects, at least, of the social environment. Such studies are particularly important, for example, in identifying characteristics of organizations, of social climates, of work situations, and other subsystems of the social environment that may be useful for measurement purposes.
Dependencies between characteristics of situations and behavlors encourage us to extend the exploration of environmental determiners of behavior. Until we can assign to environmental variables the proportions of variance in behavior for which they account, our understanding of behavior will be incomplete.
When this is accomplished, we shall have achieved the goals of this ecologic emphasis and will have returned the science of psychology to its true course.
